Allocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty by Rodica Branzei & Marco Dall'aglio






This paper provides several answers to the question “How to cope with rationing problems with
interval data?” Interval allocation rules which are efficient and reasonable are designed, with special
attention to interval bankruptcy problems with standard claims and allocation rules incorporating the
interval uncertainty of the estate.
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1. Introduction
Various disputes including those generated by inheritance and bankruptcy
(O’Neill [8]), firms’ allocation of funds among their divisions (Pulido, Sánchez-
Soriano and Llorca [10]), assignment of taxes (Young [13]), mass privatization of
state-owned enterprises (Young [14]) are often affected by interval uncertainty re-
garding the homogeneous divisible good at stake. To deal with such situations, we
design allocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty inspired by the existing lit-
erature on classical bankruptcy and taxation rules (Thomson [11]) and by rules for
division problems under interval uncertainty regarding claims (Branzei et al. [4]).
To cope with interval uncertainty, we denote by I(R+) the set of all closed and
bounded intervals in R+ and by I(R+)
N the set of all n-dimensional vectors whose ele-
ments belong to  I(R+). Let I,  J  ∈  I(R+) with  ], , [ I I I =   ], , [ J J J =   then,
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] , [ J I J I J I + + = + .  We say that I is weakly better than J, which we denote by
J If , if and only if  J I ≥  and  J I ≥ . We also use the reverse notation  I Jp , mean-
ing  J If .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents bank-
ruptcy problems and rules under three scenarios regarding interval uncertainty: uncer-
tainty-free estate and claims; uncertainty free estate but interval uncertainty regarding
claims; interval uncertainty regarding both the estate and claims. In Section 3 we focus
on bankruptcy situations where only the estate is affected by interval uncertainty
whereas the claims are more standard. We propose two families of interval rules incor-
porating the interval uncertainty regarding the estate which are based on some classical
bankruptcy rules and show that they are efficient and reasonable. Section 4 deals with
the general setting of bankruptcy problems with interval data. Here we propose efficient
interval allocation rules which are based on some classical bankruptcy rules and proce-
dures to transform claim intervals into more standard claims. It turns out that interval
rules based on different procedures satisfy particular forms of reasonability. In Section 5
we place our work in the existing literature on bankruptcy problems with interval data.
2. Bankruptcy situations and rules
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a fixed set of claimants among which an estate has to be
divided. A classical bankruptcy situation with a set of claimants N is a pair (E, c),
where  0 ≥ E  is the estate to be divided and 
N R c + ∈  is the vector of claims such that
∑ ≥ ∈ . E ci N i  We denote by BR
N the set of bankruptcy situations (E, c) with player set N.
The total claim is denoted by  ∑ ∈ = . i N i c C  A bankruptcy rule is a function
N N R BR f + → :  which assigns to each bankruptcy situation 
N BR c E ∈ ) , (  a payoff
vector 
N R c E f + ∈ ) , (  such that 0 ≤ f(E, c) ≤ c (reasonability) and ∑ = ∈ E c E fi N i ) , (
(efficiency). In this paper we are interested in bankruptcy rules that are continuous
and coordinate-wise (weakly) increasing in E. We recall the most widely used rules.




c E PROP i
i = ) , (  for all i ∈ N. The constrained equal awards rule (CEA) assigns
equal amounts to all claimants subject to no one receiving more than his/her claim,
and is defined by CEAi(E, c) = min{ci, α} for all i ∈ N, where α is determined by
∑ = ∈ E c E CEAi N i ) , ( . The constrained equal losses rule (CEL) determines equal
losses (the value of the claim unsatisfied) subject to no one receiving a negativeAllocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty 21
amount, and is defined by CELi(E, c) = max{ci – β, 0} for all i ∈ N, where β is deter-
mined by ∑ = ∈ E c E CELi N i ) , ( . The Talmud rule (TAL, Aumann and Maschler [1])
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 otherwise. The random arrival rule (RA, O’Neill
[8]) assumes that claimants are fully compensated, one after the other, until the
money runs out. The order of arrival is random, and the rule considers the aver-
age compensation of each claimant. Consequently, the definition is given by
{ } {} 0 , max , min
!
1
) , ( ) ( ) ( , ∑ ∑ < ∈ ∈ − = j i j N j i Π i c E c
n
c E RA N π π π  for all i ∈ N, where Π
N is
the class of bijections from N into itself. Finally, the adjusted proportional rule (AP,
Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [6]) refines the proportional method by assigning to each
claimant the amount conceded to him/her by the others (his/her minimal right) plus
a share of the remainder of the estate proportional to the remainders of the claims,
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with mi(E, c) being the minimal right of claimant i, i ∈ N, and m(E, c) = (mi(E, c))i∈N.
The last three rules are particular solutions of the bankruptcy game v(E,c), which
compute the minimal rights for each coalition S,  ∅  ≠  S  ⊂  N, as minv(E,c)(S) =
{ } . 0 , min \ i S N i c E ∑ ∈ − . In fact, if we consider the Shapley value, the prenucleolus and
the τ-value of v(E,c), we recognize the random arrival rule, the Talmud rule, and the
adjusted proportional rule, respectively, for the classical bankruptcy situation (E, c).
Situations where the estate E is uncertainty-free but claimants are facing uncer-
tainty regarding their effective rights, knowing only the lower and upper bounds on
their claims, have already been examined. In this context, Branzei et al. [4] described
two types of families of allocation rules leading to efficient and reasonable solutions
for bankruptcy situations with interval claims: one-stage rules based on compromise
claims and multi-stage rules based on compromise claims in adjusted claim intervals.
In Section 3, inspired by some of these rules, we design allocation rules for bank-
ruptcy situations where interval uncertainty affects the estate as well as the claims.
An interval bankruptcy situation with set of claimants N is a pair (E, c), where
] , [ E E E =  is the uncertain estate to be divided and c ∈ I(R)
N is the vector of interval
claims  ]) , [ ..., ], , ([ 1 1 n n c c c c  such that  C E ≤ , where  i N i c C ∑ ∈ =  (Branzei and Alpars-
lan Gök [2]). We denote by BRI
N the family of bankruptcy interval situations withR. BRANZEI, M. DALL’AGLIO 22




( c E , where  ] , [
~
E E E∈  and  N i i c c ∈ = ) ~ ( ~  with  ] , [ ~
i i i c c c ∈  for each i ∈ N, are ele-
ments of BR
N because  E E C C
~ ~
≥ ≥ ≥ , where C
~
 is the total selection claim.
A bankruptcy interval rule is a function 
N N R I BRI F ) ( : + →  assigning to each
bankruptcy situation (E, c) ∈ BRI
N a vector 
N R I c E F ) ( ) , ( + ∈  such that:
•  ] , [ ) , ( ] 0 , 0 [ i i i c c c E F p p  for each i ∈ N (reasonability);
•  ] , [ ) , ( 1 E E c E Fi
n
i = ∑ =  (efficiency).
We call a rule weakly reasonable if  ] , [ ) , ( ] 0 , 0 [ i i i c c c E F p p  for each i ∈ N.
3. Allocation rules incorporating the interval uncertainty
regarding the estate
In this section we focus on the subclass of interval bankruptcy situations where the
estate is affected by interval uncertainty, whereas all the claims are given in the form
of degenerate intervals, i.e.  ii cc =  for all i ∈ N. For simplicity, we denote the vector
of claims by c = (ci)i∈N, where ci ∈ R+ is the standard claim of i, and by BRDC
N the
related set of bankruptcy problems (E, c) where  ] , [ E E E∈  with  E E > .
In the sequel, we propose two families of interval allocation rules which are based
on classical bankruptcy rules f which are continuous and coordinate-wise (weakly)
increasing with respect to the estate. Most bankruptcy rules possess this property. In
our setting this implies that for all  ] , [ , 2 1 E E E E ∈  with E1 < E2 it follows that fi(E1, c)
≤ fi(E2, c) for all i ∈ N. First, we introduce the interval allocation rule based on f,
N N f R I BRDC F ) ( : + → , defined by  )] , ( ), , ( [ ) , ( c E f c E f c E F i i
f
i = , for all (E,  c)  ∈
BRDC
N and i ∈ N.
Proposition 1. The interval allocation rule F
f is efficient and reasonable.
Proof: Let (E, c) ∈ BRDC
N. Notice that the coordinate-wise (weakly) increasing
property of f with respect to the estate guarantees that  ) , ( ) , ( c E f c E f i i ≤  for all i ∈ N.
The efficiency of F
f follows from the efficiency of f. Furthermore, by the reasonability
of f we obtain, for each i ∈ N,
] , [ ) , ( ] 0 , 0 [ c c c E F
f
i p p .
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Next, we introduce another family of interval allocation rules in BRDC
N based on
classical bankruptcy rules f which satisfy the same assumptions as before. Here, we
use a two-stage approach:
Stage 1. The lower bound on the value of the estate, E , is distributed over the
claimants based on f by using the initial claims ci, i ∈ N. Denote by  ) , ( c E fi  the share
obtained by individual i for i ∈ N.
Stage 2. The amount  E E −  is distributed over the claimants based on f by using
the residual claims  ) , ( c E f c i i − , i ∈ N.
Given  f, we introduce the two-stage interval allocation rule based on f,  F
f,(2):
BRDC
N N R ) ( + → , defined by
))] , ( , ( ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , (
) 2 ( , c E f c E E f c E f c E f c E F i i i
f
i − − + =
for all i ∈ N and (E, c) ∈ BRDC
N.
Proposition 2. The interval allocation rule F
f,(2) is efficient and reasonable.
Proof: The efficiency of F
f,(2) is obvious. To prove the reasonability we note first
that from the reasonability of f we have  i i c c E f ≤ ≤ ) , ( 0 , and also
i i i i i i c c E f c c E f c E f c E E f c E f = − + ≤ − − + ≤ ) , ( ) , ( )) , ( , ( ) , ( 0
for each i ∈ N.
□
4. Allocation rules incorporating the uncertainty
regarding the estate and the claims
In this section we introduce some families of interval allocation rules in the class
BRI
N also based on well known classical bankruptcy rules f which are continuous and
coordinate-wise (weakly) increasing with respect to the estate. Notice that in such
a bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRI
N all the data (the estate and the claims) are af-
fected by interval uncertainty. Let f be the classical bankruptcy rule agreed upon. We
try to overcome the extra difficulty introduced by the interval uncertainty regarding
claims with the aid of compromise factors ti ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N. Let ti be the compromise
factor proposed by claimant i for transforming his/her interval claim  ] , [ i i c c  into the
more standard claim  i i i i
t
i c t c t c
i ) 1 ( − + =  for each i ∈ N.R. BRANZEI, M. DALL’AGLIO 24
We introduce the t-compromise interval allocation rule based on f,  F
t,f:  BRI
N
N R ) ( + → , defined by






i c E f c E f c E F =  for each i ∈ N.
We call such a rule t-reasonable if [0, 0]  ] , [ ) , (









i ≤  for each i ∈ N, t-reasonability implies weak reasonability.
Proposition 3. The interval allocation rule F
t,f is efficient and t-reasonable.
Proof: Let t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ [0, 1]
N. The efficiency of F
t,f follows from the effi-
ciency of rule f. The t-reasonability of F








i c c E f ≤ ≤ ) , ( 0   for each i ∈ N.
□
We notice that the vector of compromise factors t ∈ [0, 1]
N  plays a key role in de-
fining the family of interval allocation rules F
t,f. Another scenario for removing the
uncertainty regarding claims is by compromising the lower and upper claims in a uni-
form way, using the same t ∈ [0, 1], which leads to  N i
t
i
t i c c ∈ = ) ( , with  i
t
i c t c =  +
i c t) 1 ( − (1 – t) for each i ∈ N. The choice of such a compromise factor t could be
made by a neutral arbitrator.
A more sophisticated procedure to introduce interval allocation rules, based on
the idea of compromising the individual lower and upper claims, is to average
t-compromise solutions according to a given probability measure (Branzei et al. [4]).
Let μ be a probability measure on  ], 1 , 0 [ 〈 B〉, where B is the σ-algebra of Borel sub-
sets of [0, 1]. Common examples of such probability measures are the Lebesgue
measure λ and the Dirac measure δa, with a ∈ [0, 1] being an atom. Consider the
t-compromise bankruptcy situations  ) , (
t c E  and  ) , (
t c E  for t ∈ [0, 1]. We introduce

























for all (E, c) ∈ BRI
N and i ∈ N.
Proposition 4. The interval allocation rule F
f,μ is efficient and weakly reason-
able.
Proof: First, from the coordinate-wise monotonicity of f with respect to the estate,




i c E f c E f ≤  for each i ∈ N. By integrating over [0, 1] and using the
monotonicity property of integrals we obtain, for all i ∈ N,Allocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty 25









i μ μ ∫ ∫ ≤ .
To derive the efficiency of F
f,μ, consider the following relations:






i = = = ∫ ∫∑ ∑∫
∈ ∈







μ μ μ ;






i = = = ∫ ∫∑ ∑∫
∈ ∈







μ μ μ .






i c c c E f c E f ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ) , ( ) , ( 0  for all i ∈ N, by integrating
over [0, 1] and using the monotonicity property of integrals, we obtain




















∫ ∫ μ μ
μ .
□
Now, we define a family of two-stage interval allocation rules based on any classi-
cal bankruptcy rule f as follows. In the first stage we distribute the lower bound on the
value of the estate E according to the lower bounds on the claims. In the second stage
we distribute E  – E according to the residual values of the claims based on the vector
of allocations determined in the first stage. Given f, we introduce the two-stage allo-
cation rule based on f, 
N N f
i R I BRI G ) ( :
) 2 ( ,
+ → , defined by
))] , ( , ( ) , ( ), , ( [ ) , (
) 2 ( , c E f c E E f c E f c E f c E G i i i
f
i − − + = ,
for all i ∈ N and (E, c) ∈ BRI
N.
Proposition 5. The two-stage interval allocation rule G
f,(2) is efficient and reason-
able.
Proof: The efficiency of G
f,(2) is obvious. Furthermore,  i i c c E f ≤ ≤ ) , ( 0  for all i ∈ N,
and
i i i i i c c E f c c E f c E f c E E f c E f = − + ≤ − − + ≤ ) , ( ) , ( )) , ( , ( ) , ( 0 ,
for all i ∈ N.
□
We notice that our two-stage approach to the interval setting is related to the
“minimal rights first” and “composition up” properties of classical bankruptcy rules.R. BRANZEI, M. DALL’AGLIO 26
The “minimal rights first” property requires the rule to first attribute the minimal right
of each creditor, i.e. the maximum of zero and the difference between the sum of the
claims of all the other creditors and the estate; then to distribute the remainder over
the claimants by taking into account the revised claims obtained by reducing each
individual claim by the corresponding minimal right. For bankruptcy situations with
reference points (Pulido, Sánchez-Soriano and Llorca [10], Pulido et al. [9]), the
exogenously given reference point for the allocation of the estate can naturally play
the role of a minimal rights allocation in the case where the estate is sufficient to
give each player his/her reference amount. Furthermore, since bankruptcy situations
with reference points can be naturally embedded in the class of interval bankruptcy
situations whose estate is known with certainty, compromise rules developed for
CERO- and CREO-bankruptcy situations (Pulido et al. [9]) become good candidates
for the resolution of conflicting interval claims. The “composition up” property is
related to the occurrence of an excess of the estate after solving the bankruptcy prob-
lem, and requires the rule of allowing creditors to keep their initial awards, revise
their claims down by these awards, and divide the residual amount according to these
revised claims. We refer the reader to Yeh [12] for an interesting study of these two
interesting properties in connection with the “secured lower bound” property within
the context of classical bankruptcy situations (Moreno-Ternero and Villar [7]).
5. Concluding remarks
This paper considers bankruptcy situations with interval data. Some families of ef-
ficient and reasonable interval bankruptcy rules are introduced with the aid of classi-
cal bankruptcy rules which are continuous and coordinate-wise (weakly) increasing
with respect to the estate. Other interval rules related to bankruptcy problems with
interval data have already been introduced in the recent literature. In Branzei and
Alparslan Gök [2] the interval proportional rule and the interval rights-egalitarian rule
are introduced on suitable subclasses of BRIG
N and related to the cores of cooperative
interval games arising from the corresponding interval bankruptcy situations. In
Branzei, Dall’Aglio and Tijs [3] interval bankruptcy rules which are interesting from
a game-theoretic point of view are introduced and studied. The common characteristic
of all interval bankruptcy rules is that such rules provide a vector of intervals which
is useful at en ex-ante stage to inform claimants what they can expect, between
two boundaries, from the interval bankruptcy problem in question. The interval allo-
cation generated by an interval bankruptcy rule will be transformed into a standard
allocation when the realizations of the estate and/or the claims occur at an ex-post
stage. To transform a vector of closed and bounded intervals into a standard vector is
not a trivial task (Branzei, Tijs and Alparslan Gök [5]). However, in the case whereAllocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty 27
vectors of intervals are obtained via interval rules introduced in this paper, the deriva-
tion of a standard allocation corresponding to the realization  E
(
 of the value of the
estate and realizations  N i i c ∈ ) ((  of the claims is quite easy from a computational point
of view. We only need to apply the chosen rule f to the classical bankruptcy problem
(Ĕ, č) for any of the one-stage rules, whereas standard allocations (x1, ..., xn) corre-
sponding to two-stage rules are given by  )) , ( , ( ) , ( c E f c E E f c E f x i i i − − + = ( (
 for each
i ∈ N. Notice that the properties of f ensure that the obtained allocation (x1, ..., xn)
belongs to the interval allocation (I1, ..., In) in question, i.e. xi ∈ Ii for all i ∈ N.
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Reguły alokacji z niepewnością przedziałową
W pracy przedstawiono szereg odpowiedzi na pytanie Jak radzić sobie z racjonalizacją problemów
związanych z danymi przedziałowymi? Zaprojektowano efektywne i uzasadnione przedziałowe zasady
alokacji, w celu informowania ludzi lub podmiotów gospodarczych, stających wobec przedziałowej nie-
pewności, o „rzetelnych” dolnej i górnej granicach ich osiągalnych podziałach akcji. Po zaprezentowaniu
problemów związanych z bankructwem i prezentacji różnych zasad postępowania w szeregu scenariuszy
związanych z przedziałową niepewnością, skupiliśmy swoją uwagę na sytuacjach, kiedy przedziałowa
niepewność odnosi się tylko do majątku firmy, podczas gdy pozostałe żądania pozostają standardowymi.
Proponujemy dwie rodziny reguł przedziałowych, stosujących przedziałową niepewność w opisie mająt-
ku i bazujących na klasycznych regułach bankructwa oraz pokazujących swoją efektywność i racjonal-
ność. W bardziej ogólnych przypadkach, w których zawarte są przedziałowe żądania, także proponujemy
efektywne reguły alokacji przedziałowej, bazującej na klasycznych regułach bankructwa i procedurach
transformacji żądań przedziałowych w żądania bardziej klasyczne. Stwierdzamy, że reguły przedziałowe
bazujące na różnych procedurach spełniają szczególne postulaty racjonalności. Nasze osiągnięcia umiejsca-
wiamy na tle literatury poświęconej problematyce bankructw z danymi przedziałowymi.
Słowa kluczowe: zasady alokacji, bankructwo, przedziałowa niepewność